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Jesus Christ and the Modern 
Sinner: Karl Earth's Retrieval of 
Luther's Substantive Christology 
Amy Ellen Marga 
Luther Seminary 
Despite Karl Barth*s lasting commitment 
to the Reformed tradition of John Calvin, it 
is the thought of Martin Luther that casts a 
long shadow over Barm's theology. As 
George Hunsinger points out. 
At certain vital points Barth follows Luther not 
only, broadly speaking, against Calvin and the 
Reformed tradition, but also against the main 
lines of the Lutheran tradition. There are points, 
in other words, where Barth actually retrieved 
Luther in order to stand \\ ith him not onl\ against 
modernity, but also against the rest of the Refor-
mation.1 
If we refocus the historical lens upon 
Barth and Luther, they can be seen to stand 
like bookends on the shelf of the modern 
age. with Luther standing at the beginning 
of what historians now call "early moder-
nity," and Barth standing at its end.2 Barth 
looked back for the sake of looking forward 
and in so doing engaged in intense study of 
Luther. Barth absorbed aspects of Luther's 
theology that allowed him to articulate 
Christian theology in deeper and more so-
phisticated ways over against modernity, 
which had through the course of the En-
lightenment set the criteria for how we 
know what we know and thus how we 
articulate the sinner's relationship to Jesus 
Christ. As Hunsinger has noted. Barth 
"almost alone among modern theologians" 
granted "uncompromising precedence to 
the Reformation over modernity itself." 
He did not reject modernity, but he "re-
fused to allow secular epistemologie s to set 
the terms for the validity of the gospel."3 
Barth"s mature Christology. seen in 
his Church Dogmatics, vol. IV. published 
in the early 1950s, has been a central chan-
nel into comparisons of his theology with 
that of Luther. Both Karin Bornkamm and 
Gerhard Ebeling have demonstrated that 
Luther and Barth share a Christocentrism 
in the best sense: clearly this was one thing 
Barth learned from Luther. Bornkamm has 
shown how Barth transformed Luther's 
conception of the offices of Christ as priest 
and king for the sake of forging a relation-
ship between Christology and soteriology .4 
1. George Hunsinger. Disruptive Grace: 
Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand 
Rapids. MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans. 2000). 282. 
2. W. Stacy Johnson, among others, has 
even suggested that Barth"s theology contains 
the seeds for postmodern theology. See his 
The Mystery of God: Karl Barth and the Post-
modern Foundations of Theology (Louisville. 
KY: Westminster John Knox. 1997). 
3. Hunsinger. Disruptive Grace. 293. 
4. Karin Bornkamm. "Die reformator-
ische Lehre vom Amt Christi und ihre 
Umformung durch Karl Barths." in Luther und 
Barth. Veröffentlichung der Luther-Akademie 
Ratzeburg. Vol. 13. ed. Joachim Heubach 
(Erlangen: Martin-Luther-Verlag. 1989). 144. 
Currents in Theology and Mission 34 4 (August 200 ) 
Marga Jesus Christ and the Modern Sinner 
261 
Ebeling traces the christological impulses 
that Barth took from Luther, even while 
Barth formed his own criticisms of the 
Reformer in the Church Dogmatics.5 But 
Barth had already begun retrieving aspects 
of Luther's Christology almost thirty years 
earlier. One example of this is a lecture that 
Barth gave in 1929 in Münster on theology 
and ethics titled "The Holy Spirit and the 
Christian Life." After a decade that in-
cluded two lecture cycles in dogmatic the-
ology and intense engagement with Roman 
Catholic theology. Barth dove into the 
works of Augustine, Calvin, and Luther. 
The result was a lecture on theology and 
ethics titled "The Holy Spirit and the Chris-
tian Life" that displays Barth's deepening 
understanding of Luther's Christology. 
In this essay I briefly present Luther's 
Christology from his 1535 Galatians com-
mentary6 and show how Barth reached back 
to retrieve this for his own theology despite 
the drastically different epistemological 
landscape of the two thinkers brought about 
by the Enlightenment. Barth reached over 
Enlightenment notions of rationality and 
morality to retrieve Luther's substantive 
Christology, and in so doing he left behind 
the psychological and historical interpreta-
tions of the person and work of Christ by 
thinkers such as Werner Elert and Karl 
Holl. Luther's theology provided Barth 
with the resources to pull Christology out 
of the grip of Enlightenment understand-
ings of the individual as an autonomous 
agent and show that reconciliation of the 
human to God by God and through God 
alone need not be beholden to modern 
theories of rationality or morality. 
Martin Luther's Christology 
in the Galatians commentary 
The richness of Martin Luther's Christol-
ogy has provided scholars with a wide 
variety of angles from which to analyze it. 
Ebeling has tried to capture its expanse 
under the terminology of a "forensic-anti-
thetical*' Christology." Finnish scholars 
such as Tuomo Mannermaa have focused 
their attention on the aspect of deification 
in Luther's early work.8 Bernhard Lohse. 
and in more detail Ian Siggins. have ap-
proached Luther ' s Christology from a more 
inductive angle,9 laying out the wide span 
of images that Luther employed, from his 
appropriation of motifs of Augustine and 
Bernard of Clairvaux to his borrowings from 
medieval piety and the New Testament.10 
This variety, however, does not weaken 
two fundamental commitments visible in 
all aspects of Luther's Christology: his 
commitment to the Chalcedonian formula 
and his commitment to human salvation as 
the central function and purpose of Christ's 
person and work. These two commitments 
are summed up in the Small Catechism: "I 
believe that Jesus Christ, true God. begot-
ten of the Father in eternity, and also a true 
human being, born of the Virgin Mary, is 
my Lord. He has redeemed me, a lost and 
condemned human being.*'11 
5. Gerhard Ebeling. Lutherstudien, vol. 3 
(Tubingen: Mohr. 1985). 495-506. 
6. Luther wrote this commentary in 
1531. but it was not published until 1535. 
7. Ebeling. Luther Studien, vol. 3. 539-46. 
8. See. for example. Der im Glauben 
gegenwärtige Christus. Rechtfertigung und 
Vergottung (Hannover: Lutheran-Verlag-
Haus. 1989). 
9. See Bernhard Lohse, Martin Luther's 
Theology: Its Historical and Systematic 
Development (Minneapolis: Fortress. 1999). 
and Ian D. Kingston Siggins. Martin Luther's 
Doctrine of Christ (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1970). 
10. See Lohse. Martin Luther's 
Theology, 220. notes 8. 9. 
11. Luther's Small Catechism, in The 
Book of Concord, ed. Robert Kolb and 
Timothy Wengert (Minneapolis: Fortress. 
2000), 355. 
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The first commitment, seen in the 
words "true God and true human being." 
points to the ancient christological dogma 
from the Council of Chalcedon in 451. 
which established that the one person of 
Christ is constituted by two natures, divine 
and human, unconfusedly. unchangeably, 
indivisibly. and inseparably. The second 
commitment is to soteriology. seen in the 
words "He has redeemed me, a lost and 
condemned human being." Luther rarely 
speaks of the person of Christ without re-
ferring to his saving work on our behalf. 
The name Christ means reconciliation of 
the sinner to God; Christ is reconciliation. 
Luther's double commitment to the 
Chalcedonian formula and to the explicit 
salvific function of Christ has been called 
by Hunsinger a "substantive" Christology.12 
Christ as very God and very human is the 
sole agent who initiates and fully com-
pletes the reconciling action that takes place 
between God and the human. No other 
component or action is necessary in a sub-
stantive Christology for reconciliation to 
be "real" for the human individual. 
An account of the substantive nature 
of Luther's Christology can be seen in his 
Galatians commentary, where he writes. 
For you do not yet have Christ even though you 
know that He is God and man. You truly have 
Him only when you believe that this altogether 
pure and innocent Person has been granted to 
you b\ the Father as your High Priest and Re-
deemer, yes. as your slave. Putting offHis inno-
cence and holiness and putting on your sinful 
person. He bore your sin. death, and curse: He 
became a sacrifice and a curse for you. in order 
thus to set you free from the curse of the Law. 
(Luther's Works [hereafter LUT 26:288) 
When Christ steps before God in our place 
as the sinner to be punished, he not only 
initiates but also completes our being made 
righteous in God's eyes. There is no other 
process outside of Christ alone that ini-
tiates and completes the justification of 
sinners. Neither the sanctification of the 
sinner nor the workings of the Holy Spirit 
in the Christian life functions the way that 
Christ's saving work does—a saving work 
that is embodied in Christ's very person. 
Christ's person embodies the precedence 
of God's grace over any "good works" of 
our own. Luther states. "Christ took the 
initiative. . . . He did not find a good will or 
a correct intellect in me. but He Himself 
took pity on me. . . . By a mercy that pre-
ceded my reason, will and intellect. He 
loved me . . . so much that He gave Himself 
for me" (LU7 26:175). 
Reconciliation begins with Christ 
alone. And it is completed in Christ alone: 
". . . victory over sin and death, salvation 
and eternal life . . . come . . . by Jesus Christ 
alone"(p. 138). There is no gradual getting 
better or gradual transformation in the sin-
ner. Justification is not completed by a 
process of sanctification. It is this once-
and-for-all sense of Christ's person and 
actions on our behalf that makes Luther's 
Christology a substantive Christology. His 
actions need no enhancement or outside aid 
and do not continue upon some gradual 
scale within the human being. What Christ 
began. Christ fully completes for us. 
The righteousness that comes to us 
through Christ's reconciling act is a righ-
teousness that brings with it its own new 
life. We are given a life that is not our own. 
for Christ's own righteousness acts upon 
us. takes us over. It decenters and destabi-
lizes the center of our own egos, for it is the 
righteousness of Christ's person and not of 
our own person. Luther claims. "I do in-
deed live in the flesh, but I do not live on the 
basis of my own s e l f (LW 26:170-71). 
When we live in Christ, we are no longer 
the one who controls this reality in our 
lives. The presence of the person of Christ 
12. Hunsinger. Disruptive Grace. 284. 
Marga Jesus Christ and the Modern Sinner 
263 
displaces ourselves as the center of our 
lives. We cannot scale this reality in our 
lives down to a size that we can grasp and 
thus control, for the righteousness of Christ 
does not become a quality that inheres 
within the human being (cf. LW 26:127). 
nor is it somehow infused into the human to 
give him or her a new identity as non-
sinner. It is a reality that remains distinct 
from us and greater than ourselves. 
Indeed, the new life in Christ thrusts 
individuals into an existence of contradic-
tions: We are now saints while still being 
sinners. As Luther states, when we believe 
the good news that Christ died for us, we 
"are reckoned as righteous, even though 
sins, and great ones at that, still remain in 
us" (LW 26:234). Thus, although Christ 
starts and finishes our reconciliation with 
God, we, living in the here and now, do not 
shed our old sinful ways. We are not rid of 
our sin. Luther writes, 
These tu o things are diametrically opposed: that 
a Christian is righteous and beloved by God, and 
yet that he is a sinner at the same time. For God 
cannot deny His own nature. That is. He cannot 
avoid hating sin and sinners: and He does so by 
necessity, for otherwise He w ould be unjust and 
would love sin. (p. 235) 
This is the heart of Luther's classical doc-
trine of the simul iustus et peccato?'. In this 
life, we live a life of opposites. of being a 
saint and sinner at the same time. 
God does not abandon us to the tension 
of saint and sinner, however. Christ's own 
presence to the reconciled sinner never 
ceases. It is an ongoing event. He is our 
44
'pillar of cloud by day and pillar of fire by 
night' [Ex. 13:21 ] to keep God from seeing 
our sin" (p. 232). 
In that Luther emphasized Christ as 
the mediator, he was able to express the 
work of Christ in both the past, what he did 
as mediator for us on the cross, as well as in 
the present, what Christ does for us today: 
The new life in Christ 
thrusts individuals into 
an existence of contra-
dictions: We are now 
saints while still being 
sinners. 
''Christ Himself is the life that I now live" 
(p. 167). The mediator comes to us con-
tinually. "Today Christ is still present to 
some," Luther states, "but to others He is 
still to come. To believers He is present 
and has come: to unbelievers He has not yet 
come" (p. 240). Thus, there is a clearly 
actualistic element in Luther's Christology 
that modern theology can draw upon. Christ 
does not remain in static. Aristotelian cat-
egories but spans the divide between God 
and human, between past, present, and fu-
ture, between action and substance, be-
tween saint and sinner. Luther's Christ is 
the One who comes, who is coming. 
The mechanism that binds the recon-
ciled sinner to Christ is faith. This is a core 
aspect of Luther's Christology in the Gala-
tians commentary. "Through faith, the 
human participates in this saving reality of 
Christ who is present in the Word. This 
faith is a union with Christ."13 Luther writes, 
. . . these three things are joined together: faith. 
Christ and acceptance or imputation. Faith takes 
hold of Christ and has Him present, enclosing 
13. Marc Lienhard. Martin Luthers 
christologisches Zeugnis (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1973^ 217. 
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Him as the ring encloses the gem. And w hoever 
is found having this faith in the Christ who is 
grasped in the heart, him God accounts as righ-
teous. (LW 26:132) 
This faith is inseparably connected to 
Christ's personal presence to us and to the 
destabilized lives that we live as the simul 
iustus et peccator. Faith is the epistemo-
logica! underpinning of Luther's under-
standing of the "I yet not I" in Christ. "The 
life I live. I live on the basis of faith," 
Luther states. "For the time of life that I am 
living I do indeed live in the flesh, but not 
on the basis of the flesh and according to 
the flesh, but in faith, on the basis of faith, 
and according to faith" (LW 26:170). 
But this inseparable connection to 
Christ's personal presence is not depicted 
as some kind of mystical union with Christ 
or "spiritual" faculty that then allows the 
believing human to make inspired state-
ments about God (LW 26:28-29:287). Al-
though Christ is present to us through faith, 
he still remains beyond the reach of natural 
human reason, in the "cloud of faith" (p. 
287). Luther states, "how [Christ] is present 
—this is beyond our thought: for there is 
darkness" (p. 130). Thus, it is precisely the 
concept of faith that maintains the distinc-
tion between Christ and the reconciled sin-
ner. It maintains the distance between 
Christ's mediating activities and the natu-
ral activity of our human intellect, which, 
finally, are still under the control of sin. 
death, and the devil. As Marc Lienhard 
puts it. "Christ is a reality "pro nobis' and 
*in nobis' but he is and remains * extra 
nos."*14 Christ is in us and for us but re-
mains as a reality outside of us. And. 
because Christ remains outside of us. he is 
beyond our rational and moral control. 
Thus, faith cannot be understood to be 
identical with human reason. For Luther, 
faith is a "mode of cognition" that is not 
identical to human reason.15 Faith is not the 
natural human capacity to understand or to 
comprehend in the way it understands ob-
jects around itself. Luther disputes the 
"Sophists" on this point, arguing that even 
though the "natural endowments" of hu-
man reason are capable of mastering physi-
cal, civic, and political matters, the intellect 
is in fact corrupt and inept in matters of the 
knowledge of God. A completely other 
form of "comprehending" is necessary in 
order for knowledge of God to arise in the 
human being. When we discuss faith. 
Luther states, "we are in an altogether dif-
ferent world—a world that is outside rea-
son" (LW 26:234). 
Nonetheless, faith neither destroys rea-
son nor renders it impotent in its own sphere. 
Faith is essentially a different kind of ratio-
nality, an "understanding" that moves be-
yond reason: it has its source and function 
in a manner different from natural human 
reason. 
Karl Barth and the modern 
challenges to Christology 
The Enlightenment s turn to the subject. 
The period of the Enlightenment brought 
with it a sustained focus upon the human 
individual as an independent, rational, and 
moral agent. The intense scrutiny upon the 
workings of the human mind and the rise of 
science in the Enlightenment made it al-
most impossible for twentieth-century theo-
logians to bring together in theological 
anthropology the incompatible opposites 
of the "I yet not I." the saint-sinner of 
Luther ' s theology, or even the Chalcedonian 
formula of Christ as very God and very 
man. and still be taken seriously. Further, 
theologians no longer could claim that hu-
14. Lienhard. Martin Luthers chnsto-
logisches Zeugnis. 290. 
15. See Brian Gerrish. Grace and 
Reason (Oxford: Clarendon. 1962). 82. 
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man knowledge of God was a distinct but 
still true and valid "knowledge." for it does 
not arise from logical thinking, scientific 
experiment, and mathematical reasoning. 
"Faith" as a form of knowledge proved 
no match for the Enlightenment concept of 
human rationality. Indeed, the distinction 
that Luther made between faith and reason 
was possible because the concept of natural 
human rationality had not yet been elevated 
to the normative status that it was in the 
Enlightenment. Before the Enlightenment 
insistence that morality and rationality obey 
certain rules of logic and science, there was 
still room for Christ to be an ''effective 
Subject"' in the rational, moral agent.16 As 
the effective Subject in humans, Christ 
imputed his righteousness to us through 
faith. He was the reference point for ratio-
nal thinking and moral decision making in 
faith. In Luther's theology, Christ was the 
reference point for every "good work" that 
came from the human individual, and good 
w orks were understood as a consequence 
of the immediacy and activity of Christ 
within the believing sinner. This imme-
diacy and activity kept the human rational 
ego decentered. allowing it to be a moral 
subject only by virtue of the "I yet not I."' It 
did not stand on its own two feet. 
The Enlightenment transformation of 
the understanding of human rationality 
hustled Christ the effective Subject out of 
theories of knowledge. This can be seen 
clearly in the thought of Descartes. Al-
though the Christian tradition was no 
stranger to a sense of inwardness (August-
ine had already found a way to God through 
a flight inward), it was anchored in the 
human subject's connection to God—in 
Luther's case, to the effective and personal 
presence of Christ in faith. Descartes loosed 
the inwardness of the human subject from 
its divine mooring, making it no longer 
necessary for human reason to operate solely 
by virtue of reference to the divine pres-
ence. He assigned a power—the power of 
"self-mastery'"—to human reason that ex-
cluded any possibility of conceiving the 
human ego as decentered.1" Human reason 
was unified, and effective in and of itself: 
no other effective Subject operated within 
it. The "I yet not I" central to Luther's 
Christology was lost. 
Immanuel Kant took Descartes' un-
derstanding of the autonomy of reason one 
step further, proposing that the very nature 
of "reason" meant that one behaves in an 
ethical manner as well.18 He pulled moral-
ity into the orbit of the Enlightenment no-
tion of reason, endowing the human with 
an unprecedented sense of moral freedom. 
This autonomous morality was "accessible 
and accepted by every moral agent:"19 the 
human individual him- or herself, without 
any mediating presence from a divine sub-
ject, had the capacity to act according to 
one's "good will." The moral nature of 
humans became rooted in autonomous rea-
soning, thus excluding any need or possi-
bility that an external force or being could 
work upon the human to make one into a 
moral being. 
Charles Taylor has judged Kant " s moral 
theory to be "a powerful... .revolutionary 
force in modern civilization. [His idea] 
seems to offer a prospect of pure self-
16. Bengt Hagglund. "Luthers Anthro-
pologie." in Leben und Werk Martin Luthers 
von 1526 to 1546. Festgabe zu seinem 500. 
Geburstag. Vol. 1 (Góttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht. 1983). 74. 
17. Charles Taylor. Sources of the Self 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
1989). 147. 
18. See Kant's Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks. Harper and Row. [1785] 1964). 
19. Manfred Kuhn. Kant: A Biography 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
2001). 285. 
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activity, where my action is determined . . . 
ultimately by my own agency as a formula-
tor of rational law."20 Natural reason itself 
is an instrument that formulates and sets 
moral principles: it alone obligates humans 
to do good works. It alone produces righ-
teousness. 
The philosophical consensus about 
human rationality and morality ushered in 
by Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant 
and Descartes was worlds apart from the 
early modern understanding of the human 
of Luther's era, where rationality reached 
its limit in relationship to the divine being 
and where morality was made possible b \ 
nothing other than the divine action. 
Lutheran theology and the "face" of Jesus 
Christ. While the Enlightenment granted 
a new autonomy to human reason, it could 
do so only by limiting reason to the sphere 
proper to it. namely, the sphere of history. 
"Reason" could no longer draw credible 
conclusions about anything that lay outside 
history and the logical sequence of events 
that make history. Speaking of Jesus as 
true God and true man became impossible. 
Credible speaking of Jesus Christ was re-
stricted to speaking of Jesus the man. Jesus 
the historical figure, the divinity of whom 
could be established only from what we 
know about his humanity "from below."21 
Throughout the nineteenth century into the 
early twentieth, leading thinkers such as 
Elert promoted Christologies based solely 
on Christ's historical appearance, on the 
"face" of Christ. His physical presence— 
his 'face'—was the only reality of God that 
humans needed to see. In the life of Jesus 
as a purely historical figure, humans have 
the full, visible, complete face of God di-
rectly and immediately before them. Jesus 
Christ did not reveal a God behind and 
beyond himself. His person and work were 
not considered revelation.22 
Because modern Protestantism did not 
think in terms of the God outside history, 
the Christology of a Lutheran like Elert did 
not seek a Christ who mediated between 
humans and a God who was perceived as an 
ultimately unknowable metaphysical "Fa-
ther." The face and life of the historical 
Jesus was enough for natural human reason 
to discover and know God in God's full-
ness. This kind of intense focus upon 
history, and the rather uncritical and naive 
trust in history and human reason that ac-
companied it. was prevalent among Protes-
tant thinkers of Barth's da\ . The substantive 
Christology of Luther lay buried deep in 
the layers of history, which makes the fact 
that Barth retrieved this aspect from Luther 
all the more remarkable. 
Barth' s retrieval of a substantive Christol-
ogy. Already in Barth's early theology 
from the decade of the 1920s, before he 
even considered writing the massive Church 
Dogmatics (first begun in 1932). he dis-
played a keen interest in the theology of the 
Reformation, but he harbored doubts about 
the accuracy of his Lutheran contemporar-
ies' representation of Luther's theology.2"1 
The Protestantism of the era. with its strong 
historicizing and psychologizing tenden-
20. Taylor. Sources of the Self. 364. 
21. Claude Welch, Protestant Thought in 
the nineteenth Centwy 1870-1914. vol. 2 (New 
Haven: Yale Universitt Press. 1985). 157. 
22. Werner Elert. Die Lehre des 
Luthertums im Abriß (Munich: Beck. 1924). 
29. For a similar Lutheran perspecm e. see 
Paul Althaus. "Theologie und Geschichte. Zur 
Auseinandersetzung mit der dialektischen 
Theologie." in Zeitschrift für systematische 
Theologie 1 (1923/24): 771. See also Barth's 
Unterricht in der christliche Religion, vol. 2 
(Zurich: Theologischer Verlag Zurich. 1990). 
par. 15:22. for his references to Elert and 
Althaus. (Hereafter Unterricht) 
23. Unterricht 15:23: 28:29-30. 
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cies evident in thinkers like Elert, was 
completely inadequate for truthful talk of 
the God of Jesus Christ. After the outbreak 
of World War I and the profoundly disturb-
ing involvement of leading Protestant theo-
logians in justifying the aggression of the 
German nation, Barth could no longer ac-
cept a doctrine of revelation that read God's 
actions and intentions directly from the 
events of history. The Lutheran view that 
only the humanity of Jesus Christ was a 
positive and direct revelation of God on the 
surface of history became unacceptable to 
him.24 If Jesus Christ was the true Savior, 
God had to be at work in him. The histori-
cal figure of Jesus of Nazareth needed to be 
part of something greater than himself. 
In his preparations for his seminal cycle 
on dogmatic theology, begun at the Uni-
versity of Göttingen in 1924, Barth discov-
ered for himself the ancient Chalcedonian 
Christology by which Christ was truly God. 
truly human, unmixed, undivided, uncon-
fused, and unseparated.25 What this discov-
ery did was allow Barth to move his theology 
beyond the historical, psychological ghetto 
of modern Christology and closer to that of 
Luther,26 closer to a substantive Christol-
ogy in which Christ's own person and work 
starts and completes our reconciliation with 
God.27 Precisely because humans come to 
know Jesus Christ as both God and man, his 
saving actions on our behalf are a real and 
effective reconciliation: 
That Jesus Christ is this one, the incarnated 
Logos God. is the absolute decisive presupposi-
tion for his work... . One can not interpret the 
officium mediatorium, the completion of recon-
ciliation between God and the human, one will 
alw ays misinterpret it if one does not previously 
know who the mediator, who the completer is in 
this act, who the representative of this officium 
is. The work of Christ has its very particular 
character, its very particular qualification, its 
very particular gradient determined through that 
which is effective here, through the very union 
with God which Christ finds himself in.28 
Contrary to his Lutheran contempo-
raries. Barth established that Christ's work 
cannot be understood on the basis of the 
historical figure of Jesus alone. Knowing 
who Christ is and what Christ does comes 
only from knowing that he is united to the 
Father as very God and very human. 
"The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life." 
In 1929, five years after his first lectures in 
Göttingen, Barth pushed even more against 
psychologized, historicized Christology in 
a lecture he gave at a theological confer-
ence in Elberfeld. Germany, titled "The 
Holy Spirit and the Christian Life." Using 
Luther. Barth demonstrated here how a 
substantive Christology of Jesus Christ the 
mediator functions as a critique of the En-
lightenment understanding of the human as 
a rational, moral agent. Barth's targets 
were soteriologies like that of Holl, whose 
emphasis on Christianity as a religion of 
''conscience'' essentially canceled out any 
need for a substantive Christology. 
In an essay on Luther's doctrine of 
justification, Holl argued against the tradi-
tional substantive Christology of Luther. 
To Holl. the contradiction between the holy 
God and the sinful human could not be 
solved by simply pointing to Christ's per-
son and work as the mediator between 
them.29 God meets the sinner with the in-
24. Unterricht 15:22. 
25. Unterricht 6:169. 193: 28:46. 
26. Unterricht 6:169, 193: 28:46. 
27. Unterricht 29:75. 
28. Unterricht 29:75. See also Bruce 
McCormack's work on this aspect of Barth's 
dogmatics in his Karl Barth's Critically 
Realistic Dialectical Theology (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 1995). 327ff. 
29. Karl Holl. Die Rechtfertigungslehre 
in Luthers Vorlesung über den Römerbrief mit 
besonderer Rückblick auf die Frage der 
H eil s gewissheit in Kirchengeschichte. vol. 1: 
Luther (Tubingen: Mohr. 1921). 91-130. 
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tenti on to forgive and transform "the hu-
man into his own image."3U Christ does not 
represent this intention and therefore does 
not function as a mediating "third thing" in 
the meeting of God and the sinner. God's 
intention can turn into actual forgiveness 
only when the human's own intentions and 
actions turn toward the good. Thus. God 
actually meets not the sinner but rather the 
human as moral agent who strives to fulfill 
the Law—as a doer of good works. Recon-
ciliation of God and the human is therefore 
not an event where the enmity between 
God and the sinner is resolved: it is merely 
a "meeting of good wills." God justifies the 
one who is already justified.31 The comple-
tion of reconciliation depends, finally, upon 
the moral fiber of the autonomous indi-
vidual. The transformation of the indi-
vidual into the imago Dei may or may not 
take place: justification is the "foundation 
for a new life." but it is up to the individual 
to gradually get better.32 
Such a moralistic soteriology rejects 
the central role of Christ as mediator be-
tween God and the sinner. It has no need 
for a substantive Christology because "sin" 
is no longer perceived as a devastating 
ontological force. Sin is a misguided good 
will, but a good will nevertheless. The 
human rational agent remains rational and 
able to make moral decisions, even as a 
sinner, for rationality contains morality 
within itself. Sin is merely a discrepancy 
between rationality and morality whereby 
sinful actions occur when human moral 
intentions do not follow reason. 
To Barth, however, the rational and 
moral constitution of the autonomous indi-
vidual does not help us get better and better. 
Sin brings the rational, moral agent to his or 
her knees. Sin is about the rational, moral 
agent's own struggle against God: it is 
human resistance to grace, not a descrip-
tion of intentions. The struggle against this 
enmity toward God is undertaken by Christ 
and Christ alone, the Reconciler Spirit. 
Using Luther's simul iustus et pec cat or. 
Barth expresses the externality of Christ's 
work upon us. The human 
will never cease to acknowledge and confess, in 
all seriousness, that one's having been justified 
is utterly not in oneself, and consequently not m 
one's human unbelief. Indeed, the Christian is 
simul peccator et Justus and the surmounting of 
this irreconcilable contradiction does not lie in 
the Christian . . . but is the action of the Word of 
God. the action of Christ, w ho is always the One 
who makes one out to be a sinner, in order to 
make one (though a sinner) into a righteous 
[hu]man." 
Not we but Christ conquers our "radical 
evil and hate" toward the living God.34 
This retrieval of a substantive Christ-
ology had implications for both human 
reason and human morality. Barth coun-
tered the rationalism in contemporary theo-
ries of justification using the terminology 
of reason itself. He argued that the only 
activity that humans can ever really know 
is our own. Human rationality, therefore, 
only perpetuates our enmity toward God. 
Our insistence upon our own limited, self-
enclosed rationality, and on controlling 
everything through our reason, does not 
bring us knowledge of God's work in Christ. 
In "The Holy Spirit and the Christian 
Life" he writes that reason, "in its unbelief, 
in its stubbornness, in its meek self-righ-
30. Holl. Die Rechtfertigungslehre. 99. 
31. Holl. 97-98. 
32. Holl. 98. 
33. Holl. 31: Barth. -Der Heilige Geist 
und das christliche Leben."" in Karl-Barth-Ge-
samtausgabe. Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten 
1925-1930. Ill (Zurich: Theologischer Verlag 
Zurich. 1994). 495. 
34. Barth. "The Holy Spirit and the 
Christian Life."" trans. R. Birch Hoyle 
(Louisville. KY: Westminster/John Knox. 
1993). 19.20. 
Marga Jesus Christ and the Modern Sinner 
269 
teousness. in which it wishes to remain by 
itself . . . does not wish to hear of some­
thing radically different from its own work­
ings" (pp. 19, 20). The exercise of reason 
does not bring us insight into God's activi­
ties: "What we can make evident to our­
selves is always our own activity. Even when 
we set this under the prefix of grace, it still 
remains our own working*' (pp. 24-25). 
With these claims, Barth locates a 
'"blind spot" in human rationality that can 
be filled only by Christ, for it is Christ alone 
who mediates himself to us through a "con­
tinual giving" of himself into faith, whose 
righteousness is "established as true in our 
flesh" (p. 29). In so doing. Barth reintro­
duces Christ as the effective Subject, so 
significant to Luther's theology, into an 
understanding of the modern sinner in rela­
tion to God. The rational agent is indeed 
subject, but a subject whose agency has 
limits in relation to God's reconciling ac­
tivity. It is "I yet not Γ* who comes to know 
God. 
Barth further buttresses his argument 
against the abilities of human reason before 
God by qualifying the ability oí faith as a 
mode of cognition, lest it too be swallowed 
up by the all-encompassing Enlightenment 
conceptions of reason. Even faith is "hid-
den from itself (p. 30: emphasis added). 
Rational thought cannot not make "faith" 
into a living knowledge of God. This is the 
task of the Holy Spirit: "but the two things, 
the acknowledgement of this contradiction 
[sin] and the knowledge of its being sur-
mounted, are not our own business, but are 
the Holy Spirit's"(p. 31). Here. too. Barth 
does not allow the human "I" to take con-
trol of one * s own faith. Faith is mediated to 
the human by God and cannot be swal-
lowed up by one's sense of self as agent. 
The destabilizing "I yet not I" remains 
central to the identity of the believing Chris-
tian. 
Β 
arth reintro­
duces Christ 
as the effective Subject, 
so significant to 
Luther's theology, into 
an understanding of the 
modern sinner. 
In his retrieval of a substantive Christ­
ology Barth also challenged the Enlighten­
ment conception of a reasonable, 
autonomous morality, and destabilized the 
human as a moral agent. When Christ is 
understood as the sole effector of our rec­
onciliation to God, the individual "person 
must be left out of consideration" (p. 26: 
emphasis added). Although human indi­
viduals are indeed agents of actions, any 
and every good work that we see as being 
"ours" is canceled out, and the "I yet not I" 
comes into effect. As Barth states, the 
work of Christ the Reconciler Spirit must 
be seen 
in its fundamental and immutable [unaußiebbar] 
restriction of ever} thing that is our o\\ η w ork. 
Wherever the action of humans in themselves, m 
w hate\ er pretense or form, is made into a condi­
tion of the human's fellowship with God. there 
the Holy Spirit is forgotten, and there sin is 
committed in order to overcome sin. (p. 20) 
Where human morality, the human will or 
conscience, is seen as the way to mediate 
the relationship between the sinner and 
God. the two aspects of reconciliation that 
need to be held together—justification and 
sanctification—fall away from each other. 
Justification turns into a slow, gradual 
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process by which the sinner thinks he or she 
could become a nonsinner through the good 
works that he or she performs (p. 21). 
Reconciliation then becomes a matter of 
the "'divine gift and man's creative action 
combined in one*" (p. 22. quoting Augus-
tine). The "I yet not I" collapses into the 
willful human ego, and a substantive Christ-
ology is dissolved. 
Barth was well aware of the implica-
tions of his modern epistemologica! inter-
pretation of Luther's substantive 
Christology. When it is properly under-
stood, first, as being fully undertaken, be-
gun, and completed in Christ's person and 
work as the God-man, and further, as an 
event that is outside the control of our 
reasoning skills and moral abilities, the 
term "Christian" must take on a very par-
ticular meaning. 
Supposing w e decide to side . .. w ith Luther . .. 
to proceed with caution when w e use the adjec-
tive "Christian" and to use the word in a way 
quite other than is the vogue in our victorious 
modern Christendom. What. then, is meant by 
such phrases as "Christian" view of the universe. 
"Christian" morality. "Christian" art? What are 
"Christian" personalities. "Christian" families. 
"Christian" groups. "Christian" newspapers. 
"Christian" societies . . . ? Who gives us per-
mission to us the adjective so profuselv? (pp. 
37-38) 
Concluding remarks 
What Barth gained from Luther's substan-
tive Christology was a way to express the 
work of Christ upon the sinner that over-
comes the human drive to relate to God as 
beings who are autonomous, reasonable, 
and good-willed. Luther " s tight unification 
of Christ's person and work highlights that 
Christ's action as the God-man and media-
tor is something that is started and finished 
in our lives by Christ alone. In that Luther 
closely connected the person and work of 
Christ with the creation of faith as a mode 
of cognition that is distinct from natural 
human reason, his Christology limits the 
capabilities of natural human reason to 
comprehend and therefore control what 
God's actions are toward us. To Barth, this 
meant that when it comes to the God-
human relationship, human reason has a 
distinct blind spot. Taking this blind spot 
seriously means that Christians, especially 
Lutherans, maintain a healthy critical dis-
tance to the process by which we weigh 
matters of moral weight using our every-
day reason and common sense. The "I yet 
not I" as the foundation for rational think-
ing provides us with a critical check upon 
the way we go about trying to lead lives we 
would like to call Christian. Sustaining the 
faith that is beyond the reach of our control 
requires that Christ continually mediate 
himself to us as a Subject working within 
us. 
Finally, taking Barth's retrieval of 
Luther' s Christology seriously means bring-
ing to light the falsity that lies in the con-
cept of an autonomous "good will" that 
accompanies modem individuals* sense of 
self. Morality never arises out of our-
selves, and moral actions always have en-
folded within them some other hidden 
motive and external influence, whether it 
be economic, personal, idealistic, or prac-
tical. It is clear in the theologies of both 
Barth and Luther that the only external 
factor that can actually make our good 
actions good is the divine influence, which 
comes from beyond our ability to rational-
ize and control, which is mediated to us in 
the person of the crucified Christ who con-
tinually works upon us as God's Reconcil-
ing Spirit. 
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